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Abstract—Network verification promises to detect errors, such
as black holes and forwarding loops, by logically analyzing the
control or data plane. To do so efficiently, the state-of-the-art (e.g.,
Veriflow) partitions packet headers with identical forwarding
behavior into the same packet equivalence class (PEC).
Recently, Yang and Lam showed how to construct the minimal
set of PECs, called atomic predicates. Their construction uses
Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs). However, BDDs have been
shown to incur significant overhead per packet header bit,
performing poorly when analyzing large-scale data centers. The
overhead of atomic predicates prompted ddNF to devise a
specialized data structure of Ternary Bit Vectors (TBV) instead.
However, TBVs are strictly less expressive than BDDs. More-
over, unlike atomic predicates, ddNF’s set of PECs is not minimal.
We show that ddNF’s non-minimality is due to empty PECs. In
addition, empty PECs are shown to trigger wrong analysis results.
This reveals an inherent tension between precision, expressiveness
and performance in formal network verification.
Our paper resolves this tension through a new lattice-
theoretical PEC-construction algorithm, #PEC, that advances the
field as follows: (i) #PEC can encode more kinds of forwarding
rules (e.g., ip-tables) than ddNF and Veriflow, (ii) #PEC verifies
a wider class of errors (e.g., shadowed rules) than ddNF, and (iii)
on a broad range of real-world datasets, #PEC is 10× faster than
atomic predicates. By achieving precision, expressiveness and
performance, this paper answers a longstanding quest that has
spanned three generations of formal network analysis techniques.
I. INTRODUCTION
In complex networks, misconfigurations continue to be
common [1], [2], causing costly unscheduled outages or
compromising security [3]–[5]. This has generated significant
interest in formally analyzing network behavior on the control
(e.g., [6]–[9]) or data plane (e.g., [10]–[15]), a class of formal
methods collectively known as network verification. In this
paper, we provide a new algorithm and data structure that can
serve as a foundation for both forms of network verification.
What make network verification interesting is its predictive
power: it promises to find network-related errors that tradi-
tional diagnostic tools, such as ping and traceroute, in general
cannot. To accomplish this feat, network verification creates
a mathematical model of the network to logically analyze
the packet forwarding behavior of packets, rather than merely
observing network traffic. This is an inherently difficult task:
even reachability checking in the data plane is NP-hard [10].
Much research therefore has gone into making formal network
analysis as efficient as possible.
∗ This work was completed at Fujitsu Laboratories of America.
First-generation formal network analysis tools (e.g., [10],
[16]–[24]) rely on SAT/SMT solvers, highly optimized back-
tracking decision procedures for solving propositional or first-
order logic problems. However, SAT/SMT solvers are too
slow to enumerate all witnesses of each network property
violation [25], and SAT/SMT solvers tend to perform poorly
on reachability queries over many distinct network paths [15].
This bottleneck prompted second-generation formal net-
work analysis techniques to use a geometric model for packet
classification instead, notably in the form of Header Space
Analysis (HSA) [11], [12], [26]. At its core, HSA repre-
sents packet headers as the difference of cubes in a multi-
dimensional hyperspace. While compact, a significant draw-
back of HSA’s difference of hypercube representation is that
it is computationally expensive to evaluate in general. This
explains why HSA uses a lazy evaluation strategy, which still
has performance problems (akin to lazy functional languages).
By contrast, third-generation formal network analysis tools
avoid the problems of lazy evaluation by pre-computing a
family of disjoint sets of packet headers. We call these packet
equivalence classes (PECs). Intuitively, each PEC contains
packet headers that experience the same forwarding behavior
through the network at each router—a form of lossless com-
pression that has been shown to make formal network analysis
more efficient in both time and space [27].1
Formal network analysis tools based on PECs include Veri-
flow [30], APV [27], ddNF [28] and Delta-net [14], all of
which detect a myriad of network errors—such as black holes,
forwarding loops, reachability and isolation violations—and
PECs help to do so in a vendor-agnostic manner. In this paper,
we focus on Veriflow [30], APV [27] and ddNF [28]. These
tools can encode match conditions with possibly many packet
header fields, so-called multi-dimensional match conditions.
However, reasoning about multi-dimensional match condi-
tions in a priority-ordered list (such as a forwarding table) is
challenging, because a higher-priority rule x may overlap with
a lower-priority rule y. Such overlapping amounts to logical
negation (i.e., y∧¬x), because x needs to be subtracted from
y. The crux of the problem is that logical negations can lead
to an exponential number of case splits. Consider some packet
header filter that uses the match condition 1∗1∗0, an instance
of a Ternary Bit Vector (TBV) where ‘∗’ matches either ‘1’ or
1While, in the worst case, the number of generated PECs is exponential
in the number of match conditions, in practice there are only relatively few
PECs [27], [28]. In fact, in restricted, but not uncommon cases, the number
of PECs is even linear in the number of match conditions [14], [29].978-1-7281-2700-2/19/$31.00 2019 c© IEEE
‘0’. The number of case splits due to TBV-negation, such as
¬(1∗1∗0), is generally exponential in the length of the TBV.
Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs) [31], [32] can efficiently
represent such case splits, and APV [27] uses BDDs to
compactly represent the space of packet headers, including
their negation. By constructing BDDs, APV produces also
canonical and optimal PECs, called atomic predicates, which
form the unique and smallest partition of packet headers [27].
But there is a catch: BDDs incur significant overhead per
bit in each packet header field, a performance bottleneck in
real-world network analysis [28]. This prompted ddNF to not
use BDDs. Instead, ddNF constructs PECs by only intersecting
TBVs. The intersection of TBVs is very efficient due to their
compact representation in memory, and experiments using
Azure data center snapshots confirm that ddNF is significantly
more efficient than APV, a remarkable achievement.
However, both ddNF’s TBVs as well as Veriflow’s multi-
dimensional trie data structure have inherent limitations
(§ II-B): they cannot efficiently represent match conditions
over arbitrary sets and ranges of ports, and their complements.
Consequently, ddNF and Veriflow cannot analyze common
firewall rules in practice (§ IV), such as iptables rule-sets [33].
Furthermore, ddNF and Veriflow’s PECs are not minimal
(§ II-C). In the case of ddNF, we show that this non-minimality
can lead to wrong analysis results, e.g., ddNF is unsuitable for
detecting shadowed rules. We catalog over forty cases of such
imprecision (§ IV-C). This motivates the following question:
Can the construction of precise and expressive
packet equivalences classes be also efficient?
Our paper answers this question in the affirmative through
a new lattice-theoretical PEC-construction algorithm (§ III),
#PEC, that combines the precision and expressiveness of
atomic predicates with the scalability of ddNF. #PEC is more
expressive than Veriflow and ddNF, because its encoding is
not tied to TBVs. As a result, for instance, #PEC can check
match conditions with arbitrary ranges, e.g., iptables rule-sets.
Moreover, #PEC can detect errors, such as shadowed rules,
that ddNF cannot in general, since its analysis is imprecise.
We show that ddNF’s imprecision is due to PECs that are
empty. We detect such empty PECs—a coNP-hard problem—
by efficiently counting the packet headers in each PEC. This
way #PEC achieves full precision, and it does so 10− 100×
faster than SAT/SMT and BDD-based solutions that encode
the PEC-emptiness problem into propositional logic. More-
over, by detecting empty PECs, #PEC constructs PECs that
are unique and minimal (§ III-F), achieving the optimality of
atomic predicates, but at least 10× faster than APV (§ IV).
To avoid the aforementioned limitations of TBVs and multi-
dimensional trie data structures, we organize packet headers
in a meet-semilattice [34] (§ III-B). Through this lattice-
theoretical framework, #PEC can formally analyze a strictly
broader class of forwarding filters than ddNF and Veriflow.
By achieving precision, expressiveness and performance, we
answer a longstanding quest that has spanned three generations
of formal network analysis techniques.
SOURCE DESTINATION PROTO ACTION
1 0.0.0.4/30 0.0.0.0/28 !UDP DROP
2 0.0.0.0/29 0.0.0.12/30 UDP DROP
3 0.0.0.4/30 0.0.0.12/30 ANY FORWARD
Fig. 1: Forwarding table (using priorities) with 3-dimensional
match conditions that neither Veriflow nor ddNF can analyze
II. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
We start by giving background on formal network analysis
(§ II-A), illustrating why achieving expressiveness (§ II-B) and
precision (§ II-C) at the same time is challenging.
A. Background: Formal Network Analysis
In this subsection, we explain through illustrations what
makes multi-dimensional match conditions challenging to
formally analyze. Readers familiar with PEC-based formal
network analysis may wish to skip this subsection for now.
Consider two physically connected routers ν1 and ν2. The
network operator wants to check the absence of forwarding
loops between ν1 and ν2. Assume that ν2 forwards packets
to ν1 according to the forwarding table in Figure 1. This
forwarding table has three priority-ordered rules: 1 , 2 and
3 , where 1 has highest priority. Since the match conditions
of 1 , 2 and 3 filter packets based on three packet header
fields, they are instances of 3-dimensional match conditions.
Consider the lowest-priority rule 3 in Figure 1. It is
not difficult to see that the set of packets matched by 3
correspond to the logic formula 3 ∧¬ 1 ∧¬ 2 . This formula
says that 3 matches only packet headers that are not matched
by 1 or 2 , thereby encoding the fact that both 1 and 2
have a higher priority than 3 .
To understand the significance of such logic formulas,
assume that ν1 forwards to ν2 all packets matched by either
1 , 2 or 3 , i.e., 1 ∨ 2 ∨ 3 . Abstractly, formal analysis
tools essentially reason about the forwarding behavior of
a network in terms of a directed graph whose edges are
annotated by such logic formulas (or PECs as we shall see),
as illustrated in Figure 2. The existence of a forwarding loop
between ν1 and ν2 depends on whether the logic formula
φ = ( 1 ∨ 2 ∨ 3 ) ∧ ( 3 ∧ ¬ 1 ∧ ¬ 2 ) is satisfiable or
not; equivalently, does there exist a packet header such that
formula φ can evaluate to true?
The challenge for PEC-based formal analysis tools is to be
able to express complex multi-dimensional match conditions,
while also being able to efficiently and precisely solve the re-
sulting constraint systems via PECs. Unlike SAT/SMT solvers,
PECs give by default the set of all such solutions (if any).
ν1
DROP
ν2
1 ∨ 2 ∨ 3
3 ∧ ¬ 1 ∧ ¬ 2
1
2
Fig. 2: Verification: is there a forwarding loop, or not?
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Fig. 3: (a) Geometric view of the three 3-dimensional match
conditions in Figure 1; (b) Hasse diagram of the meet-
semilattice induced by these match conditions (see also § III)
What does a solution to this challenge entail? To answer
this, consider Figure 3a, a geometric view of the three match
conditions in Figure 1. Since there are 3-dimensional match
conditions, Figure 3a has three axes: the x-axis and y-axis
correspond to the range of the source and destination IP
addresses, respectively, whereas the z-axis evenly divides the
space into UDP and non-UDP packets. The color of each
rectangular cuboid corresponds to 1 , 2 and 3 . The key
idea behind PECs is to divide the whole geometric space into
disjoint sub-spaces prior to the analysis.
Note that each overlapping of cuboids corresponds to an
overlapping of a pair of rules. In general, however, reasoning
about the intersection of higher-dimensional cuboids, as in Fig-
ure 3a, is NP-hard. For example, there is no forwarding loop
between ν1 and ν2, since the 3-dimensional space denoted by
φ is in fact empty, an instance of an NP-hard query.
B. Challenge: Expressiveness
Notice that the highest-priority rule 1 in Figure 1 comple-
ments an individual packet header field. That is, 1 matches
only non-UDP packet headers whose source and destination
IP address match 0.0.0.4/30 and 0.0.0.0/28, respec-
tively. However, the PEC-construction schemes in Veriflow
and ddNF are not designed for multi-dimensional match
conditions with arbitrary ranges, sets of values, or their com-
plements (all of which can be found in iptables rule-sets [33]).
Veriflow and ddNF’s limitation is due to the fact that they
are tied to TBVs, where Veriflow represents TBVs as a trie
data structure with nodes that can have three children for
‘0’, ‘1’ and ‘∗’. The problem is that a single TBV cannot
represent match conditions such as the non-UDP example
above. As another instance, an arbitrary range that is not an IP
prefix can only be represented by multiple TBV. This renders
the TBV representation of match conditions inefficient and
impractical. By contrast, #PEC can efficiently encode such
match conditions via element types (§ III-B). While APV can
represent the same match conditions as #PEC, APV’s reliance
on BDDs makes it at least 10× slower than #PEC (§ IV-D).
C. Challenge: Precision and Minimality of PECs
For ddNF to be able to analyze the network in Figure 2,
let us further simplify the example by replacing the the three
ν′1
DROP
ν′2
{X,Y,Z}
{Z}
{X}
{Y }
Fig. 4: Wrong result in ddNF, due to non-minimal PECs
match conditions of the rules 1 , 2 and 3 with the fol-
lowing three IP prefixes, respectively: x = 10.57.0.0/19,
y = 10.57.32.0/19 and z = 10.57.0.0/18. This
simplifies the forwarding table in Figure 1 accordingly, where
each rule now only matches packets based on longest IP prefix
matching—something that ddNF is designed to handle. We
remark that our simplification preserves a vital characteristic
of the example: reasoning about it requires only two PECs,
which form atomic predicates by definition (§ III-F).
However, ddNF constructs three PECs, denoted by up-
percase letters: X and Y that represent all IP addresses in
x = 10.57.0.0/19, y = 10.57.32.0/19, respectively,
and Z for all IP addresses in z = 10.57.0.0/18, except
those IP addresses in x and y. By construction, X , Y and Z
are disjoint, so {X,Y, Z} is indeed a set of PECs.
The crux of the problem is that {X,Y, Z} is not minimal,
because there is a PEC that is empty, namely Z . To illus-
trate the impact of this superfluous PEC, consider Figure 4.
Notice that each edge in Figure 4 has a corresponding edge
in Figure 2. The problem is that ddNF’s PEC construction
fails to precisely capture the Boolean formulas along the edges
in Figure 2: ddNF wrongly reports a forwarding loop between
ν′1 and ν
′
2, because the edges in Figure 4 labelled by Z (shown
in bold) form a spurious cycle. This cycle is spurious, and
therefore leads to a false alarm, because the conjunction of the
corresponding Boolean formulas in Figure 2 is unsatisfiable.2
In addition to false alarms, ddNF’s limitation can also
manifest itself as a failure to detect network-related errors: in
our example, ddNF will not detect that the last rule in Figure 2
is shadowed.3 The possibility for both false alarms as well as
false negatives means that ddNF comes with the overhead to
always sanity check its results, a serious limitation (§ IV-C).
Our experiments (§ IV) show that #PEC is 10−100× faster
than alternative SAT/SMT solvers and BDD-based solutions
for detecting empty PECs. To achieve this speedup, #PEC
exploits the fact that it is enough to find the number of packets
in a PEC to check the PEC’s emptiness, rather than finding a
witness for its non-emptiness. This reveals, in particular, that
in the context of formal network analysis counting is much
faster than backtracking on a wide range of realistic datasets.
III. LATTICE-THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
In this section, we highlight the technical approach behind
#PEC (§ III-A), before explaining its data structures (§ III-B–
III-C) and PEC-construction algorithm (§ III-D). We explain
2A Boolean formula is unsatisfiable whenever it can never evaluate to true.
3There are two kinds of shadowed rules: (i) a single higher-priority rule
covers some lower-priority rule, or (ii) the union of several higher-priority
rules covers some lower-priority rule. Here ddNF fails to detect the latter.
how to answer queries in #PEC (§ III-E). Finally, we show
that #PEC constructs the minimal set of PECs (§ III-F).
A. Technical Approach
To illustrate our approach, reconsider the match conditions
1 , 2 and 3 in Figure 1. Recall that 1 complements an
individual packet header field. We can represent such and other
match conditions by so-called element types (Figure 7).
The geometric interpretation (§ II-A) we considered in Fig-
ure 2 was only in three dimensions. In general, the geometric
view is unfeasible, since it requires reasoning about hyper-
cubes as the number of packet header fields increases. Instead,
#PEC constructs a meet-semilattice, a form of partially ordered
set in which every finite subset of elements has a greatest
lower bound [34]. In doing so, #PEC is able to represent
match conditions that ddNF and Veriflow cannot, while also
achieving precision and performance, as described below.
Figure 3b shows the Hasse diagram of the meet-semilattice
produced by #PEC, given the match conditions in Figure 1.
A Hasse diagram has an edge from a vertex v to a vertex u
whenever u is a subset of v (written u ⊂ v), and there is no
other vertex w such that u ⊂ w ⊂ v. In other words, only
non-transitive edges are included in the Hasse diagram.
Figure 5 gives the more familiar interpretation of the ele-
ments in the meet-semilattice as match conditions. Note that
the color of the rows in Figure 5 corresponds to the coloring
of the corresponding match conditions in Figure 1.
Observe that the meet-semilattice in Figure 3b contains
more elements than there are match conditions. Intuitively, the
reason is that the meet-semilattice describes the overlapping
of all match conditions. This intuition is made precise by
the requirement that every meet-semilattice is closed under
intersection: it must contain every element that is the result
of intersecting sets of other elements. For example, elements
e and f are in the meet-semilattice because e = b ∩ c and
f = c ∩ d , respectively. The last two rows in Figure 5 give
a more familiar interpretation of elements e and f .
#PEC bases its meet-semilattice construction on the algo-
rithm in [35], but with a twist: we maintain the cardinality
of each PEC—the number of packet headers in each PEC.
Crucially, an empty PEC has cardinality zero. This way, #PEC
detects that e∪ f = c , which ddNF cannot. Unlike a per bit
combinatorial backtracking search with SAT/SMT solvers, our
SOURCE DESTINATION PROTOCOL
a 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 ANY
b 0.0.0.4/30 0.0.0.0/28 !UDP
c 0.0.0.4/30 0.0.0.12/30 ANY
d 0.0.0.0/29 0.0.0.12/30 UDP
e 0.0.0.4/30 0.0.0.12/30 !UDP
f 0.0.0.4/30 0.0.0.12/30 UDP
Fig. 5: Six semi-meetlattice elements induced by the three 3-
dimensional match conditions b , c and d where b features
negation of a protocol header field, e.g., ‘!UDP’
A , a− ( b ∪ c ∪ d ) C , c − (e ∪ f) E , e
B , b − e D , d − f F , f
Fig. 6: PECs due to the match conditions (colored rows)
in Figure 5, using the Hasse diagram in Figure 3b
cardinality computation uses the structure of the semilattice
and harnesses the computing power of ALUs [36] (IV-D2).
Next, we discuss the technical details behind #PEC, specif-
ically: its data structures for representing match conditions
(§ III-B) and PECs (§ III-C), as well as its algorithm that use
these data structures to compute PECs (§ III-D) and answer a
network operator’s queries about the network (§ III-E).
B. Representation of Match Conditions via Element Types
At its core, #PEC features an abstract data type for match
conditions, called element type, which strictly generalizes the
expressiveness of Veriflow and ddNF’s TBVs. For example,
using element types, we encode the match conditions in Fig-
ure 5 as 3-tuples 〈F1, F2, F3〉 where F1 and F2 denote ranges
of source and destination IP addresses, respectively, whereas
F3 denotes a set of protocols where ‘!’ on the protocol field
is encoded by efficiently complementing a bitset.
For its generalization, #PEC imposes only two basic re-
quirements on element types: elements must form a finite
partially ordered set, whose cardinality must be computable in
polynomial time. Figure 7 shows fundamental element types
used in practice that satisfy these requirements where the
partial ordering corresponds to the usual subset inclusion order.
For example, if x and y are of type ip_prefix, x ⊆ y means
that every IP address in x appears also in y.
Each element type features three operators: equality (=),
intersection (∩), and cardinality. All element types in Figure 7
can be efficiently implemented using data structures that use
contiguous memory, and our implementations have therefore
high cache locality, similar to TBVs in ddNF. We remark that
since x ⊆ y holds exactly if x ∩ y = x, the subset-inclusion
operator (⊆) is derived automatically, a default implementation
that can be optionally optimized.
Some element types such as disjoint_ranges and
set<T> where T is a fixed-size type, support a complement
ELEMENT TYPE DESCRIPTION
ip_prefix IP prefix, convertible to range
optional<T> Wildcard or a value of type T
tbv<N> Fixed-length TBV
range Half-closed interval, e.g., [0 : 10)
disjoint_ranges Set of disjoint ranges
set<T> Finite set of values of type T
tuple<E1, . . . ,Ek> Tuple where Ej are element types
Fig. 7: Element types to form complex (i.e., multi-
dimensional) packet header match conditions
(‘!’) operator. This allows for more complex match conditions,
such as complements on protocol fields as in Figure 5. By
contrast, the tuple element type has no complement operator
because it is computationally too expensive [11].
More generally, by introducing element types, #PEC can
tightly control the use and effects of complements, allowing
only forms of negation that can be efficiently implemented.
Example. The match conditions in Figure 1, and the corre-
sponding meet-semilattice elements in Figure 5, can be rep-
resented by 3-tuples of element type tuple<ip_prefix,
ip_prefix, set<protocol>> where protocol is an
enumeration type. Alternatively, if there is no need to be able
to complement the protocol header field, the last tuple com-
ponent could be also replaced by optional<protocol>.
C. PEC-representation as a DAG
#PEC represents the Hasse diagram of a meet-semilattice as
a directed acylic graph (DAG). Since such a Hasse diagram
can be shown to be unique up to graph isomorphism [34], so
is the DAG that #PEC constructs using the later algorithm.
Therefore, #PEC represents each PEC by a pointer to a
DAG node. Each such PEC denotes the packet headers that
are in the element associated with the pointed to DAG node,
minus the elements in its children. For example, given the
meet-semilattice in Figure 3b, uppercase letter A denotes the
PEC that includes the packet headers in a, excluding those in
b , c and d . Figure 6 defines the other PECs similarly. By
construction, all PECs are pair-wise disjoint. For example, the
intersection of the PECs B and C in Figure 3b is empty,
whereas b ∩ c is non-empty. Each node n in the DAG
has the following three fields: (i) n.elem denotes the match
condition associated with n; (ii) n.children contains all the
DAG nodes c such that c 6= n and c.elem ⊆ n.elem and
there is no other DAG node c′ such that n 6= c′ 6= c and
c.elem ⊆ c′.elem ⊆ n.elem ; (iii) n.cardinality corresponds
to the number of packet headers in the PEC denoted by n.
Example. Let na be the root node of the DAG in Figure 3b
such that na.elem = a and na.children = {nb, nc, nd}. Note
that neither nf and ne are in na.children , because they are
not direct children of na. We shall see that #PEC computes
nc.cardinality = 0, i.e., the PEC denoted by nc is empty.
D. Algorithm for Computing PECs
The algorithm of #PEC is divided into three procedures,
each of which accesses the global variable Modified Nodes
that determines what PEC-cardinalities need to be re-
computed. We explain each procedure in turn.
The main procedure, INSERT (Algorithm 1), takes as input
an element—a match condition of the kind as explained
in § III-B—that is to be added into the meet-semilattice. To do
so, INSERT calls FIND OR CREATE NODE(element) which
uses a hash table (not shown) to determine when a new DAG
node n, satisfying n.elem = element , has to be created or
not. Only in the former case, when new = true, is n inserted
into Modified Nodes and the subprocedures INSERT NODE
and COMPUTE CARDINALITY are called, as discussed next.
To insert a new node n into the DAG that represents
the Hasse diagram of the meet-semilattice, INSERT NODE is
called on the root of the DAG. Intuitively, INSERT NODE
(Algorithm 2) works by case analysis on the three possible
partial orderings between a pair of nodes (line 4, 6 and 9).
By using max children , we only add a child c to a parent
provided that c’s element is maximal with respect to the other
children elements in Γ (line 20 and 21–23), thereby ensuring
that all children of a parent remain mutually incomparable.
The correctness of the induced updates to the DAG edges
(line 17, 22 and 23) follows directly from the proof in [35],
since we only augment the algorithm by maintaining what
nodes have been modified along the way (seeModified Nodes
on line 18 and 15). There may be multiple such nodes when
the insertion of a single new match condition requires multiple
DAG nodes to be created, due to the requirement that the
lattice be closed under meets, as illustrated next.
Example. Consider the DAG in Figure 8a whose nodes corre-
spond to the elements a through e in Figure 8c, and suppose
we want to insert element f now. For clarity in what follows,
let np denote a DAG node that satisfies np.elem = p. As
expected, the call INSERT(f) creates DAG node nf . However,
it also creates ng and nh for elements g and h in Figure 8c,
respectively, since b ∩ f = g and d ∩ g = h; hence,
Modified Nodes = {na, nb, nd, nf , ng, nh}. The resulting
DAG is shown in Figure 8b (new elements shown in bold).
We compute PEC-cardinalities using the set of modified
nodes: once Algorithm 2 returns, the computation continues
on line 8 in Algorithm 3 where COMPUTE CARDINALITY
is called for every node in Modified Nodes (line 6–7), and
as it does so Modified Nodes shrinks after each call to
COMPUTE CARDINALITY, until it becomes empty.
The re-computation of PEC-cardinalities works as follows.
COMPUTE CARDINALITY in Algorithm 3 traverses the DAG
using a queue (line 2). We initialize the PEC-cardinality of the
input DAG node n by counting the packets in its associated
element (line 3), using the cardinality operator from § III-B,
before subtracting the PEC-cardinality of n’s descendants.
To do so, the PEC-cardinality of all the modified children
is computed (line 9) prior to updating n’s PEC-cardinality
(line 12). Since there may be multiple paths to the same node
in the DAG, COMPUTE CARDINALITY uses a local variable
(line 2) to ensure it does not subtract too much (line 7) as it
traverses the sub-DAG rooted at COMPUTE CARDINALITY’s
input DAG node. By deferring the re-computation of PEC-
cardinalities for several insertions, the computation can be
Algorithm 1 Insert new element into meet-semilattice
1: procedure INSERT(elem)
2: n,new ← FIND OR CREATE NODE(elem)
3: if new then
4: Modified Nodes .insert(n)
5: INSERT NODE(Root , n) ⊲ Root .elem = ⊤
6: for n′ ∈ Modified Nodes do
7: COMPUTE CARDINALITY(n′)
Algorithm 2 Update DAG representing meet-semilattice
1: procedure INSERT NODE(parent , n)
2: Γ← {}
3: for child ∈ parent .children do
4: if child .elem ⊆ n.elem then
5: Γ.insert(child)
6: else if n.elem ⊆ child .elem then
7: INSERT NODE(child , n)
8: return
9: else
10: e′ ← n.elem ∩ child .elem
11: if e′ is not empty then
12: n′,new ← FIND OR CREATE NODE(e ′)
13: Γ.insert(n′)
14: if new then
15: Modified Nodes .insert(n′)
16: INSERT NODE(child , n′)
17: parent .children .insert(n)
18: Modified Nodes .insert(parent)
19: max children ←
20: {c ∈ Γ | ∀c′ ∈ Γ: (c.elem ⊆ c′.elem → c = c′)}
21: for max child ∈ max children do
22: parent .children .erase(max child)
23: n.children .insert(max child)
amortized, if so desired. Note that the set of generated PECs
is invariant under the insertion order of elements.
Unlike SAT/SMT solvers or BDD-based solutions—which
can prove that a PECs is non-empty by finding a witness—
#PEC computes PEC-cardinalities instead. In the worst case,
this computation is quadratic in the size N of the DAG
where N can be exponential in the number of input match
conditions [28].
E. Answering Operator Questions via PEC-based Queries
When applying a PEC-based formal network analysis tech-
nique to a set of packet headers decribed by a logical query, it
is necessary to convert the query into a set of PECs. In #PEC,
we perform this conversion as follows.
Foremost, we assume that each logical query is a Boolean
combination of logical predicates that have the same element
type (Figure 7) as the match conditions in the meet-semilattice.
a
b
✸✸
✸
c d
✔✔
✔✔
✔✔
✔
e
⊥
(a)
a
✺✺✺✡✡✡
b
✷✷
✷
❊❊
❊❊
❊ f
c
✷✷
✷✷
d
✸✸
✸ g
☛☛
☛
e h
✡✡
✡
⊥
(b)
DESTINATION PROTO
a 0.0.0.0/0 ANY
b 210.4.214.0/23 ANY
c 210.4.214.0/24 ANY
d 210.4.215.0/24 ANY
e 210.4.214.0/24 ICMP
f 0.0.0.0/0 ICMP
g 210.4.214.0/23 ICMP
h 210.4.215.0/24 ICMP
(c)
Fig. 8: Two meet-semilattices (a and b) for different subsets
of (c) 2-dimensional match conditions
Algorithm 3 Compute and/or update cardinality of PECs
1: procedure COMPUTE CARDINALITY(n)
2: queue ← [n]; visited ← {n}
3: n.cardinality ← cardinality(n.elem)
4: while queue is not empty do
5: n′ ← queue .dequeue()
6: for child ∈ n′.children do
7: if child 6∈ visited then
8: if child ∈ Modified Nodes then
9: COMPUTE CARDINALITY(child)
10: visited .insert(child)
11: n.cardinality ←
12: n.cardinality − child.cardinality
13: queue .enqueue(child)
14: Modified Nodes .erase(n)
If a predicate in the query is not present in the meet-
semilattice, we first insert it via Algorithm 1.
Under these assumptions, a query is then converted into a
set of PECs by invoking Algorithm 4, a recursive function on
the logical structure of the input query. We remark that our
last assumption ensures that line 3 in Algorithm 4 always finds
a node in the DAG, i.e., n is never null. As part of our case
study (§ IV-C), we give an example of a query conversion.
Algorithm 4 Convert a query to a set of PECs
1: function CONVERT TO PECS(query)
2: if query is an element type then
3: n← FIND NODE(query)
4: return SUBTREE(n)
5: else if ∃ g : query = ¬g then
6: Universe ← SUBTREE(Root)
7: return Universe − CONVERT TO PEC(g)
8: else if ∃ g, h : query = g ∧ h then ⊲ ‘g ∨ h’ is similar
9: G← CONVERT TO PECS(g)
10: H ← CONVERT TO PECS(h)
11: return G ∩H ⊲ Use ‘∪’ for ‘g ∨ h’
F. Minimality of PECs
Next, we show that the set of non-empty PECs produced
by #PEC form atomic predicates in the following strict sense:
Definition (Atomic Predicates [27]). Let M be a set of
predicates, each of which represents a match condition of a
firewall or forwarding rule. ThenM’s set of atomic predicates,
written A(M) = {α1, . . . , αk}, satisfies the following:
1) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, αi 6= false;
2) (
∨k
i=0 αi) = true;
3) αi∧αj = false for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k} such that i 6= j;
4) Each match condition p in M, where p 6= false, is equal
to the disjunction of some subset of atomic predicates:
p =
∨
i∈S(p)
αi where S(p) ⊆ {0, . . . , k};
5) k is the minimal number such that the set A(M) =
{α1, . . . , αk} satisfies the above four conditions.
Yang and Lam show that the set of atomic predicates is
unique [27], which they compute using BDDs. Given a set
of rule match conditions that can be expressed using element
types (Figure 7), the next theorem shows how to compute
this unique and minimal set through a fundamentally different
algorithm that uses lattice theory and model counting.
Theorem (Optimality of #PEC). Given as input a set of match
conditions M of an element type, the set of non-empty PECs
constructed by #PEC forms atomic predicates A(M).
Proof. The proof can be found in Appendix C.
Put simply, #PEC’s output is as good as APV’s [27]. We
re-emphasize two important assumptions: (i) match conditions
must be expressed as element types (Figure 7), and (ii) the
same inputs are supplied to both tools. Condition (ii) is
violated when, say, APV is allowed to pre-process forwarding
rules by aggregating match conditions that are associated with
the same output port. #PEC does not perform such port-
aggregation pre-processing step, a design decision we made
because the partitioning of the packet header space would need
to be re-computed every time some port is changed.
IV. EVALUATION
For our study, we experimentally evaluate different imple-
mentations of PEC-construction schemes (§ IV-A), namely:
#PEC, APV, ddNF and Veriflow where possible. We evaluate
both the SAT/SMT and BDD-based solutions of the PEC-
emptiness problem as well as our counting method. As part
of our evaluation, we analyze firewalls and forwarding rules
collected from a variety of sources (§ IV-B). Using these
datasets, we uncover real-world cases where ddNF raises false
alarms and misses errors (§ IV-C), which #PEC successfully
avoids. We then evaluate #PEC’s performance (§ IV-D).
A. Implementations
Here we outline our implementations of PEC-emptiness
checks (§ IV-A1), and APV as well as #PEC (§ IV-A2).
1) Three PEC-emptiness checking procedures: In addition
to implementing #PEC’s counting method, we want to evaluate
the SAT/SMT and BDD-based solutions to the PEC-emptiness
problem that use propositional logic to precisely encode when
a PEC is empty. Their symbolic encoding works as follows.
Let x be a match condition of a rule, and denote with Cx
the set of direct children of element x in the DAG constructed
by #PEC (recall § III-C). By construction, every child c in
Cx is a strict subset of x, i.e., c ⊂ x. We emphasize that, for
efficiency reasons, we only consider the direct children of x, so
DATASET SHORT DESCRIPTION
REANNZ-IP [37], [38] 1,159 distinct IP prefixes
REANNZ-Full [37], [38] 1,170 OpenFlow rules
Azure-DC [25] 2,942 ternary 128-bit vectors
Berkeley-IP [14], [39] 584,944 distinct IP prefixes
Stanford-IP [11] 197,828 distinct IP prefixes
Stanford-Full [11] 2,732 ternary 128-bit vectors
Diekmann [33] Thousands of 8-tuples
Fig. 9: Summary of datasets
all children in Cx are mutually incomparable, i.e., for any child
c and c′ in Cx, neither c ⊂ c
′ nor c′ ⊂ c. To implement the
propositional logic PEC-emptiness solutions, we construct the
following Boolean formula: x ∧ ¬
(∨
c∈Cx
c
)
—equivalently,
x∧ ¬c1 ∧ ¬c2 ∧ . . .∧ ¬cn where c1, c2, . . ., cn are x’s direct
children in Cx. For checking the formula’s satisfiability, we
use a SAT/SMT solver or construct a BDD, as detailed next.
Our BDD implementation uses the C++ BuDDy library.
We set the intial node number and cache size by manual
tuning and choosing values that yield better results. In the
case of the SAT/SMT implementation, we call Z3 [40]. To
avoid additional parsing overhead, we use Z3’s C++ API to
construct the Boolean formulas, rather than using the more
standard SMT-LIB [41] or DIMACS format for SAT solvers.
As part of the Boolean encoding of element types (re-
call § III-B), we convert tbv<N> elements into N Boolean
variables, one for each non-∗ ternary bit. For the conversion
of set<T>, which is implemented using bitsets, we encode
the disjunction of the indexes of the set bits using ⌈log2K⌉
Boolean variables where K is the length of the bitset. For the
tuple<E1, . . . ,Ek> encoding, we designate b = b1+ . . .+bk
Boolean variables where bj is the number of Boolean variables
needed to represent Ej . The final encoding is the conjunction
of the Boolean encoding of each tuple coordinate.
2) Implementation of APV, ddNF and #PEC: To rigorously
evaluate the performance of our tool against others, we imple-
ment a version of APV and #PEC within the same framework:
we opted for Z3 [40]. Our re-implementation of APV applies
the same optimizations as proposed in [28]. We do not have to
re-implement ddNF, since it is already available as an open-
source module in Z3. Similar to ddNF, our implementation of
#PEC leverages Z3’s highly optimized TBV implementation.
We implement the other element types as a C++11 library,
which we describe in more detail in Appendix B.
B. Datasets
Our evaluation uses 64 different datasets, extracted from
five independently collected routing tables and firewalls col-
lections [11], [14], [25], [33], [37]. Figure 9 categorizes our
datasets according to their source of origin. Each dataset is
encoded as a list of rule match conditions of a specific element
type (recall Figure 7 in § III-B). Since ddNF only supports
TBVs, we encode the match conditions in our datasets as
TBVs whenever possible, which is feasible for all datasets
except the ‘Diekmann’ dataset, as described below. Irrespec-
tive of the element type, we ensure all match conditions per
dataset are unique, since duplicates could be processed with
almost zero cost. We describe each category of dataset in turn.
a) REANNZ: The REANNZ-Full dataset [37] contains
more than a thousand OpenFlow rules, extracted from a single
routing table that was used in the Cardigan deployment [38].
The OpenFlow rules in the REANNZ dataset use the following
header fields: source and destination MAC addresses, ether-
type, source and destination IP address, IP protocol field, and
source and destination TCP ports. We convert each match
condition in the rules to a ternary 216-bit vector. From the
full dataset, we extract REANNZ-IP which contains only IP
prefixes, but also encoded as TBVs.
b) Berkeley-IP: The Berkeley-IP dataset originates
from [14] where IPv4 prefixs from the RouteViews
project [39] were evaluated in the context of the UC Berkeley
campus network topology. Our dataset focuses only on the
IPv4 prefixes, which we encode as 32-bit long TBVs.
c) Azure-DC: The Azure-DC dataset [25] contains syn-
thetic FIBs that simulate Azure-like data centers as deployed
by Microsoft at that time. It contains a total of nearly 3000
match conditions, each of which is a ternary 128-bit vector.
d) Stanford: The Stanford dataset originates from Stan-
ford’s backbone network [11], which contains configurations
of sixteen Cisco routers. For each router, we generate its
transfer function [11] which models the static behavior of
the router (including forwarding and ACLs). We then use
the match conditions in the transfer function, encoded as
ternary 128-bit vectors, to produce a dataset for that router
(e.g Stanford-Full/boza). To measure the effect of analyzing
a network containing all sixteen routers, we also combine
all sixteen datasets into a single one, Stanford-Full, which
contains a total of 2,732 unique ternary 128-bit vectors. In
our Stanford-IP dataset, we extract the IP prefixes directly
from the raw router configurations, thereby avoiding the IP
prefix compression feature in HSA’s transfer functions. As a
result, our Stanford-IP datasets are significantly larger than the
datasets used in the evaluation of HSA [11] and ddNF [28].
e) Diekmann: The Diekmann datasets contains match
conditions from real-world Linux iptables rule-sets [33]. We
parse the following packet header matching fields: source and
destination IP prefix, source and destination port, protocol,
connection state, input and output interface. We encode these
as a mixture of TBVs and regular bitsets, which we combine
into 8-tuples. We ignore wildcard characters for interfaces. We
simplify each original iptables rule-set through a pre-processor
that propagates match conditions along iptables chains in a
depth-first manner, similar to function inlining. This essentially
flattens a multi-chain iptables configuration into a list of match
conditions without jumps and returns, so they conform to the
same format as the other datasets.
C. Case Study
In this subsection, we describe real-world cases of impreci-
sion in ddNF, all of which #PEC handles successfully. Due to
space, we only illustrate a few examples (in our full study, we
encountered over three dozen cases of imprecision in ddNF).
To begin with, ddNF misses 35 shadowed rules in the
REANNZ dataset. We found that ddNF misses four shadowed
rules in the Stanford datasets, one in each of the ‘soza’, ‘sozb’,
‘yoza’, and ‘yozb’ Cisco routers. Furthermore, in the Stanford
dataset, ddNF fails to check that every packet whose destina-
tion IP address matches the IP prefix 171.64.79.160/24
is forwarded from router ‘yozb’ to router ‘yoza’. For this
query, ddNF wrongly reports that some packets with such
a destination IP address are dropped. The slightly simplified
relevant rules in the dataset for the ‘yozb’ router are as follows:
Destination=171.64.79.160/28 => yoza
Destination=171.64.79.176/28 => yoza
Destination=171.64.79.128/27 => yoza
Destination=171.64.79.192/27 => yoza
Destination=171.64.79.224/27 => yoza
Destination=171.64.79.0/25 => yoza
Destination=171.64.79.0/24 => DROP
Here, ddNF produces this wrong result, because the union
of IP prefixes that forward to ‘yoza‘ equals the IP prefix of
the last rule that drops packets: the match condition of the last
rule, therefore, is encoded as a singleton set that contains an
empty PEC—the same underlying cause as described in § II-C.
As a more complicated example, consider the following
human-readable form of the OpenFlow rules part in the
REANNZ dataset (slightly simplified to help with readability),
ordered from highest to lowest priority:
Protocol=ICMP => Controller
Destination=210.4.214.0/24 => Port 1
Destination=210.4.215.0/24 => Port 1
Destination=210.4.214.0/23 => Port 2
Destination=ANY => DROP
The match conditions associated with these OpenFlow rules
induce the DAG shown in Figure 8. Suppose a network
operator wants to answer the following query:
“Are all non-ICMP packets destined to IP prefix
210.4.214.0/23 sent to Port 1?”
Formally, this query is a Boolean combination of the form
210.4.214.0/23,ANY∧¬(0.0.0.0/0,ICMP) where the
first and second conjunct are elements b and c in the DAG
in Figure 8, respectively. Using Algorithm 4 in § III-E, we
convert the query into the set of PECs {B,C,D}. Since B
is a PEC associated with a rule that outputs the packet at
port 2, ddNF concludes that the above property is violated.
However, ddNF’s verification result is incorrect: since B is
empty no such violation can be realized in the actual network.
#PEC correctly detects that the property holds. For the sake
of brevity, we omit the discussion of five other, but similar,
examples of imprecision in the REANNZ dataset.
D. Performance Evaluation
We evaluate #PEC’s performance along two dimensions,
namely: (i) time and memory usage to construct #PEC’s meet-
semilattice; (ii) time and memory usage for detecting empty
PECs. We discuss our results in turn.4
1) PEC-construction: We compare #PEC to APV, and Z3’s
implementation of ddNF. We ensure that every implementation
benefits from the same optimizations (§ IV-A2). We find
that #PEC consistently outperforms APV and ddNF in Z3
where, on larger datasets, the speed-up is more than 10×.
For example, on the Azure-DC dataset, our re-implementation
of #PEC in Z3 is approximately 30× faster than ddNF. APV
times out on the Berkeley-IP dataset after 10 hours, whereas
#PEC completes the PEC-construction in 45 minutes. We
include in #PEC’s total run-time the time it takes to check
PEC-emptiness, when comparing #PEC and APV. For this
4All experiments are run on a Linux machine with an Intel Xenon CPU
Dataset Insertions PECs
Empty
PECs
Atomic
Preds.
PEC-construction
time (s)
PEC-emptiness check (s) APV (s) Memory (MB)
Z3 ddNF #PEC BDD SAT Card. BDD SAT Card. APV
REANNZ-IP 1,159 1,160 25 1,135 <1ms <1ms 0.016 0.414 <1ms 0.001 6 6 3 5
REANNZ-Full 1,170 12,783 275 12,508 0.112 0.009 2 9 0.018 3 14 26 9 10
Azure-DC 2,942 5,096,869 10,450 5,086,419 3301 121 20112 47829 30 25669 4,429 5,797 2,365 2,517
Berkeley-IP 584,944 584,945 29,813 Timeout Timeout 2709 1553 460 0.515 Timeout 302 701 227 Timeout
Stanford-IP/soza 184,682 184,682 4,841 179,841 471 347 7 82 0.119 4951 102 251 69 49
Stanford-IP/yoza 4,746 4,746 3 4,743 <1ms <1ms 0.076 2 0.002 2 8 9 4 6
Stanford-IP/All 197,828 197,828 4,874 192,954 266 199 19 89 0.156 5149 122 265 85 53
Stanford-Full/soza 524 16,764 81 16,683 0.056 <1ms 0.668 9 0.024 2 18 19 10 13
Stanford-Full/yoza 507 60,363 231 60,132 5 0.17 4 38 0.17 20 46 65 31 28
Stanford-Full/All 2,732 1,176,095 48,906 1,127,189 560 28 692 1958 4 2314 895 1,077 544 439
Diekmann/G 5,321 889,646 40 889,606 - 39 413 4729 10 2385 3,843 3,854 3,924 608
Diekmann/J 6,004 1,058,897 56 1,058,841 - 71 486 5654 13 2936 4,558 4,573 4,656 700
Diekmann/K 3,242 400,911 257 400,654 - 18 157 2084 3 732 1,997 2,006 2,031 233
Diekmann/P 578 492,378 4 492,374 - 47 168 1837 4 635 1,563 1,573 1,606 324
Diekmann/Q 307 4,626 38 4,588 - 0.087 0.763 17 0.016 0.94 21 29 18 7
Fig. 10: Evaluation results for a subset of datasets. See Appendix D for full experimental results table.
comparison, we use the 39 datasets in which either APV or
#PEC runs for more than 100ms, excluding the Berkeley-
IP dataset where APV times out. In 95% of these 39 cases,
despite #PEC’s PEC-emptiness check, #PEC is at least 10×
faster than APV, and 25% of this time #PEC’s speed-up is
at least 100×. On average, #PEC is at least 80× faster than
APV. Finally, APV and #PEC’s memory usage averages out
to be the same across these datasets. Figure 10 shows parts
our experimental results, see Appendix D for the full details.
The fact that #PEC outperforms APV is expected, since
#PEC eliminates the per-bit overhead of BDDs. The perfor-
mance difference between #PEC and Z3’s implementation of
ddNF, in turn, can be explained in terms of the number of
intersection and subset operations required to insert a new
match condition into their respective data structure: their total
run-time is proportional to these operations. For example, in
the Stanford-Full dataset, #PEC requires 0.4 million whereas
ddNF in Z3 takes 8 million such operations, a 20× improve-
ment. #PEC’s improvement over Z3’s implementation of ddNF
are similar on the other datasets.
2) PEC-emptiness checking: We compare #PEC’s counting
method to the SAT/SMT and BDD-based solutions to check-
ing PEC-emptiness. We evaluate the performance of PEC-
emptiness checking using the 24 datasets in which #PEC
runs for more than 100ms. We perform the PEC-emptiness
check after the PEC-construction has completed. We take extra
precautions in our implementations to ensure a fair comparison
(§ IV-A1). Figure 10 shows that #PEC’s counting method
significantly outperforms the SAT/SMT and BDD-based ap-
proaches: #PEC achieves at least a 10× speed-up compared
to the SAT/SMT and BDD-based approach in over 95% of
cases. On average, #PEC is at least 500× and 200× faster
than the SAT/SMT and BDD-based approaches, respectively.
To understand why #PEC’s cardinality-based approach out-
performs the SAT/SMT and the BDD-based approaches, re-
consider the IP prefixes in § II-C. Representing x, y, and
z in propositional logic requires 19, 19, and 18 variable
assignments respectively, corresponding to their non-wildcard
bits. Just encoding Z = z − (x ∪ y) in SAT requires near
60 logic gates, excluding the task of checking satisfiability.
Representing the predicates using BDDs requires the same
number of BDD nodes. Assuming logical BDD operations are
linear in their operand size, computing Z at least requires
CPU cycles proportional to the cumulative size of the three
BDDs. On the other hand, the cardinality of each predicate in
the example fits into a single machine word. We need only
2 arithmetic CPU operations to compute the cardinality of
Z (i.e |z| − |x| − |y|), and then check if it is zero. While
in theory there are still near 60 operations performed (at the
bit level), #PEC harnesses the computing power of ALUs to
finish the operations in fewer CPU cycles. For example, in
the Stanford-Full dataset where each node in the DAG has 3
children and 12 nodes in its subtree on average, the BDD-
based approach requires 3 × 128 low-level BDD operations
on average (each spanning tens of CPU instructions). By
contrast, our cardinality-based approach needs at most 3 ALU
operations for each subtraction. So #PEC should be at least
(3×128)/(12×3) ≈ 10× faster than the BDD-based approach,
and our experiments show indeed at least a 127× speed-up.
3) Comparison with Veriflow: We compare #PEC to the
original implementation of Veriflow [42]. Since that imple-
mentation of Veriflow only supports a restricted form of
OpenFlow rules where arbitrary per-field bitmasks are dis-
allowed, it cannot analyze the majority of our datasets. We
therefore restrict our experiments with Veriflow to a simpli-
fied version of the Stanford-Full dataset. We use the default
packet header field ordering in Veriflow. We ask Veriflow
to only find ‘Equivalence Classes’ (ECs), rather than each
EC’s forwarding graph. In this restricted setting, Veriflow
takes 41 s to create 3,778,324 ECs, using 1GB of memory.
Despite #PEC’s support for arbitrary bitmasks, it is still more
efficient than Veriflow, in both time (30 s) and space (0.5GB):
specifically, #PEC constructs only 1,066,645 PECs in 27 s, and
finds 44,418 empty PECs in 3s.
E. Discussion: Importance of Empty PECs
We showed that ddNF’s non-minimality of PECs is due
to PECs that are empty. In our case study (§ IV-C), we
exemplified real-word cases where empty PECs lead to wrong
analysis results, which are very likely to hinder technology
adoption [43]. We emphasize that we only gave illustrative
examples; our list is not exhaustive, and it includes cases where
ddNF misses errors. In practice, therefore, ddNF is only as fast
as the slowest decision procedure needed to sanity check its
results, a fundamental limitation. By contrast, #PEC’s analysis
is correct by construction (§ III-F), and its performance is not
dependent on BDDs or SAT/SMT solvers, which are orders
of magnitude slower in finding empty PECs (§ IV-D2).
V. RELATED WORK
Similar to APV [27] and ddNF [28], #PEC has many
potential applications in the field of network correctness. The
literature in this field is vast and includes BGP configuration
checking (e.g., [7], [44]–[51]), ACL misconfiguration detec-
tion (e.g., [52], [53]), firewall checking (e.g., [17], [18], [21],
[54]), SDN verification (e.g., [20], [23], [55], [56]), testing
(e.g., [2], [57]–[60]), debugging (e.g., [61], [62]), differential
analysis (e.g., [63]), concurrency analysis (e.g [64], [65]),
automatic repair (e.g., [66]–[68]), synthesis (e.g. [69]–[71]),
programming languages (e.g. [72]–[76]), safe network updates
(e.g., [77]–[80]), data plane checking (e.g., [10], [11], [16],
[25]), real-time checkers [12], [14], [30], [81], and more
general network analyses (e.g., [6], [8], [9], [19], [82], [83])
together with suitable levels of abstractions (e.g., [84], [85]).
Our work is most closely related to ddNF [28], APV [27],
Delta-net [14] and Veriflow [30], since they all partition
packet headers somehow. However, these formal network
analysis tools also differ in important ways, as summarized
by Figure 11 using characteristics, which are divided into
three blocks: (i) whether the analysis is precise PECs remain
the same when the priority or output port of rules change;
(ii) common kinds of match conditions of practical interest;
and (iii) finally, attributes of the underlying algorithms. We
discuss each of these tools in turn:
a) ddNF [28]: #PEC achieves precision when ddNF
cannot. Furthermore, we have shown that #PEC can detect
shadowed rules, whereas ddNF cannot in general. As a result,
#PEC can verify equivalence of forwarding tables, whereas
ddNF cannot. We have also shown that #PEC is more expres-
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Match conditions with bit masks    # G#
Wildcard on packet header fields    #  
Match conditions with sets of values  #  # #
Negation on packet header fields  #  # #
Range filters beyond IP prefixes  #   #
PEC-cardinalities  # # # #
Negation-free PEC-construction   #  #
Canonical PEC-representation     #
Minimal and unique set of PECs  #  # #
Fig. 11: Feature comparison of closest related work
sive than ddNF in the kind of match conditions supported,
e.g., iptables rule-sets. The DAG produced by #PEC can be
shown to be isomorphic to ddNF’s, but #PEC is up to 30×
faster than ddNF in constructing it (§ IV).
b) APV [27]: APV produces PECs in the form of atomic
predicates, the smallest partition of the packet header space.
#PEC also constructs the fewest PECs (§ III-F), and it does
so 10× faster than APV (§ IV-D). Through an optional pre-
processing step, APV may further reduce the problem size
by aggregating match conditions per output port. However,
when the priority or the output port of a rule changes, so
would atomic predicates for the entire network then. By
contrast, #PEC and ddNF only create PECs that are invariant
under changes to the priority of rules and/or their actions.
As explained in the introduction, APV’s PEC-construction
algorithm is not negation-free, explaining why it relies on
BDDs [31], [32], whereas neither #PEC nor ddNF do.
c) Delta-net [14]: Delta-net is specifically designed for
real-time analysis of large-scale BGP-controlled data cen-
ters [86]. It only supports forwarding rules that match pack-
ets based on ranges, possibly with arbitrary lower and up-
per bounds (unlike ddNF). Due to its limited expressive-
ness, Delta-net achieves quasi-linear time complexity, whereas
ddNF and #PEC’s higher expressiveness has an exponential
worst-case time complexity. In addition, unlike ddNF and
#PEC, Delta-net’s run-time is independent of the order in
which match conditions are inserted. Delta-net exploits the
fact that the negation of a range can be efficiently computed,
so its PEC-construction scheme is not negation-free.
d) Veriflow [30]: Veriflow uses a multi-dimensional trie
data structure to represent PECs. To do so efficiently, Veriflow
imposes assumption that prevent it from analyzing most multi-
dimensional match conditions in our datasets (§ IV-D). The
PECs constructed by Veriflow depend on the order of levels
in the multi-dimensional tries, which can render its memory
usage and run-time performance unpredictable.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Our case study (§ IV-C) and experiments (§ IV-D) reveal the
tension between precision, expressiveness and performance:
Veriflow and ddNF impose assumptions that prevent them
from analyzing most of our dataset, and ddNF’s analysis is
imprecise. By contrast, APV is very expressive and precise
but significantly slower than Veriflow and ddNF. Our work
offers a new lattice-theoretical, algorithmic framework for
formal network analysis that is expressive, precise and fast,
thereby addressing a longstanding problem that has spanned
three generations of formal network analysis tools.
To achieve this, we identified and efficiently solved the
coNP-hard problem (Appendix A) of deciding whether a
PEC is empty or not. We showed that both SAT/SMT and
BDD-based solutions to this problem perform poorly. This
lead to #PEC, which uses a model counting method that is
10−100× faster than the SAT/SMT and BDD-based solutions.
In addition, #PEC constructs the unique minimal number of
PECs, and it does so 10× faster than APV’s atomic predicates.
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APPENDIX A
WORST-CASE COMPLEXITY
Here we prove results about the theoretical worst-case
complexity of #PEC’s underlying model counting method.
Given a pair 〈x, Y 〉 where x is an element (recall § III-B)
and Y is a finite set of elements, define PEC〈x, Y 〉 ,
x −
⋃
y∈Y y to be the set of packet headers in x that are
not included in the union of elements in Y . Without loss
of generality, we make the simplifying assumptions that all
elements in Y are a subset of x, and every element in Y is
maximal with respect to subset inclusion. Both conditions can
be satisfied through a preprocessor that runs in polynomial
time. For example, if Y contains the ternary bit vectors ‘101’
and ‘10∗’, we can remove the former because 101 ⊆ 10∗.
Define the PEC-emptiness problem as follows: given a pair
〈x, Y 〉 where x is an element and Y is a set of elements, is
PEC〈x, Y 〉 empty? In an analogous way, PEC-cardinality is
defined to be the number of packet headers in PEC〈x, Y 〉.
Theorem (PEC-emptiness complexity). The problem of decid-
ing whether a PEC is empty or not is coNP-complete.
Proof. To show that the PEC-emptiness problem is coNP, it
suffices to prove that deciding the non-emptiness of a PEC is
NP, which requires only a packet header as witness. To prove
coNP-hardness, we proceed as follows.
Let TAUT be the problem of deciding whether a given
propositional logic formula in disjunctive normal form (DNF)
is a tautology, a coNP-complete problem. To show that the
PEC-emptiness problem is coNP-complete, we reduce from
TAUT. For this reduction, recall that a DNF formula is a
disjunction of clauses, each of which is a conjunction of
literals of the form x or ¬x for some Boolean variable x. Let
φ be a DNF formula over the Boolean variables x1, x2, . . . ,
xn. For each clause ck in φ, we can construct in polynomial
time a ternary bit-vector vk = 〈y1, y2, . . . , yn〉 where each
ternary bit yi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n satisfies the following:
yi =


1 if ℓi ∈ φ and ℓi = xi,
0 if ℓi ∈ φ and ℓi = ¬xi,
∗ if φ contains no literal ℓi.
⊤ : 4
1 ∗ 1 : 1
❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧
11∗ : 0 ∗10 : 1
❘❘❘❘❘❘❘❘❘❘❘
111 : 1
❋❋❋❋❋❋❋
②②②②②②②
110 : 1
❊❊❊❊❊❊❊
②②②②②②②
⊥ : 0
❉❉❉❉❉❉❉
③③③③③③③
Fig. 12: Hasse diagram and PEC-cardinalities (in bold) for the
DNF formula (x1 ∧ x3) ∨ (x1 ∧ x2) ∨ (x2 ∧ ¬x3)
Let V be the set of ternary bit vectors induced by φ, and define
⊤ to be the ternary bit vector of length n where each bit is a
wildcard, i.e., ‘∗’. Then PEC〈⊤, V 〉 is empty if and only if φ
is a tautology, proving coNP-hardness. We conclude that the
PEC-emptiness problem is coNP-complete.
Example. To illustrate the reduction in § A, consider the
following DNF formula φ: (x1∧x3)∨ (x1 ∧x2)∨ (x2 ∧¬x3).
Each element x in the associated Hasse diagram in Figure 12
is also annotated with the cardinality of PEC〈x, Cx〉 where
Cx contains all direct children of x. Note that the PEC that
is associated with the top element (⊤) is non-empty, which
means that φ is not a tautology. We remark that the clause
x1 ∧ x2 is redundant in φ in the sense that its removal does
not change the truth values of φ. This redundancy surfaces as
an empty PEC (namely, PEC〈11∗, {111, 110}〉), as denoted
by ‘11∗ : 0’ in Figure 12.
In the mode of operation where #PEC counts packet headers
in each PEC, it is not difficult to see that the produced
PEC-cardinality information can answer the following #P-hard
counting problem (#DNF): how many different variable as-
signments will satisfy a given formula in DNF? The following
proof reduces #DNF to the problem of counting the number of
packet headers that are not matched by any of the input match
conditions, proving the #P-hardness of the PEC-cardinality
problem. The quantity in the last proof step is illustrated by
the outermost gray area at outermost part of the Venn diagram
in Figure 13, where circles and differently colored regions
denote input match conditions and PECs, respectively.
Theorem (Complexity of PEC-cardinality). Counting the
packet headers in the disjunction of input match conditions
is a #P-hard problem.
Proof. The proof proceeds by reduction from #DNF:
1) on input of a DNF formula φ over n Boolean variables,
convert each clause ck in φ to a n-length ternary bit
vector vk, as defined in § A;
2) collect these n-length ternary bit vectors into set V ;
3) send V to oracle to obtain the cardinality of PEC〈⊤, V 〉;
4) subtract PEC〈⊤, V 〉’s cardinality from 2n.
Example. We continue § A. Suppose the three clauses in the
DNF formula φ represent match conditions. The number of
packet headers in the disjunction of these match conditions is
then 23 − 4 = 4, since ⊤ : 4 according to Figure 12 where
⊤ = ∗ ∗ ∗ matches any three bits.
Fig. 13: Venn diagram of three match conditions, denoted
by circles, which collectively induce eight PECs, shown as
differently shaded regions
0 10 12 16 27 MAX
begin end
Fig. 14: Internals of disjoint_ranges where the MAX
constant corresponds to the maximal upper bound of any range
APPENDIX B
IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS
In this appendix, we give more details regarding the im-
plementation of element types. Since it is easy to implement
ip_prefix, optional<T> and tbv<N> as bit vectors,
we focus our discussion on disjoint_ranges, set<T>
as well as tuple.
Firstly, disjoint_ranges internally represents bound-
aries of half-closed intervals as a sorted array of numbers.
An invariant of disjoint_ranges is that the beginning
and end of the underlying array contain the smallest (i.e.,
zero) and largest (i.e., MAX) representable number, respec-
tively. By adjusting an internal offsets for delimiting the array
bounds, this ensures that negation on disjoint_ranges
is a constant-time operation, which allows us to efficiently
represent complements of, say, arbitrary TCP/IP port range.
For example, Figure 14 shows the internals of the disjoint
set of half-closed intervals {[10 : 12), [16 : 27)}, whereas
the set {[0 : 10), [12 : 16), [27 : MAX)} corresponds to its
negation by adjusting the begin and end delimiters accord-
ingly. As expected, the cardinality of disjoint_ranges is
merely the sum of its constituent ranges.
Similar to TBVs in ddNF, we implement set<T> as
a ‘bitset’, i.e., a compact heap-allocated array of machine
words which are manipulated via bitwise operators. As a
result, set intersections, subset checks, cardinality computation
(i.e., number of set bits), and negations are performed very
efficiently. The length of set<T>’s underlying bitset is equal
to the number of distinct values of T used by all the input sets
plus an additional bit representing all values not explicitly used
in the inputs (in case at least one such value exists).
By standard point-wise extension [34], all tuples constructed
from the other element types in Figure 7 also form partially
ordered sets. For example, if x and y are 3-tuples that
represent the match conditions in Figure 5, then x ⊆ y
if and only if the following coordinate-wise subset inclu-
sions hold: (i) source(x) ⊆ source(y), (ii) destination(x) ⊆
destination(y) and (iii) protocol(x) ⊆ protocol(y).
We remark that the cardinality operator on a k-tuple is
computed by multiplying the cardinalities of all its k elements,
which can be done efficiently by using standard arbitrary-
precision integers, where folding expressions for tuples, as in
C++17 [87], allow for effective optimizations.
APPENDIX C
PROOF: MINIMALITY OF PECS
In this subsection, we give the proof of the ‘Optimality of
#PEC’ theorem in § III-F:
Proof. Recall that #PEC efficiently detects all empty PECs
using its counting method. It is easy to see that this set of
non-empty PECs computed by #PEC satisfies the first four
conditions of the definition of atomic predicates (§ III-F).
It remains to show that the set of non-empty PECs satisfies
condition 5 (minimality). We write ‘YL’ for Yang and Lam’s
Algorithm 3 in [27]. Fix M to be a set of predicates input
to YL and #PEC. Since YL generates atomic predicates [27],
which are minimal by definition, it suffices to show that the
predicates represented by every non-empty PEC produced by
#PEC is in the set of atomic predicates generated by YL.
By a simple induction on n, it is easy to show that for a set
of input predicates M = {P1, P2, ..., Pn}, each predicate of
the form φ = X1 ∧X2 ∧ ...∧Xn 6= ⊥ where Xi ∈ {Pi,¬Pi}
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n is in the set of atomic predicates generated
by YL. Therefore, due to the uniqueness of non-empty PECs
generated by #PEC (a corollary of condition 3), it suffices to
show that each non-empty PEC generated by #PEC for input
M represents a predicate of the above conjunctive form.
Let n be a DAG node whose cardinality is non-zero. This
means that n represents a PEC (i.e., PEC(n) , n.elem −∨
c∈n.children c.elem) that is non-empty. For each DAG node
m, let A(m) be the set of its ancestors (including m) in
the DAG produced by #PEC. We claim that the predicate
represented by PEC(n) is equivalent to (written “≡”)
∧
{Pi ∈
M : ∃a ∈ A(n) : a.elem = Pi} −
∨
{Pi ∈ M : ∀a
′ ∈
A(n) : a′.elem 6= Pi}, which is of the above form φ after
distributing negation through disjunction.
To prove our claim, first note that PEC(n) ≡ n.elem −∨
d∈D(n) d.elem where D(n) is the strict subtree of n, i.e.,
D(n) contains all nodes n′ such that n′.elem ⊂ n.elem.
Second, note that for any node m, ∀a ∈ A(m) : m.elem ⊆
a.elem , since the edges in the DAG represent subset-inclusion.
So n.elem ≡
∧
a∈A(n) a.elem . But note that for any ancestor
a in A(n) such that a.elem 6∈ M (i.e., a is created as a result
of closure under intersection), we can replace a with the con-
junction of the elements of A(a), which are still in A(n). We
can repeat this (finite) process until we get a conjunction that
only comprises DAG nodes a ∈ A(n) such that a.elem ∈M,
i.e., we can express n.elem through a conjunction of DAG
nodes whose elements are in the set of input predicates. Thus
n.elem ≡
∧
{Pi ∈M : ∃a ∈ A(n) : a.elem = Pi}.
Now let n′ 6∈ (A(n) ∪ D(n)) be arbitrary. In other
words, n′ is a DAG node that is neither an ancestor nor
descendant of n and, by definition of A(n), n′ 6= n.
Note that ∃dn′ ∈ D(n) : n.elem ∧ n
′.elem ≡ dn′ .elem ,
because #PEC’s lattice is closed under intersection. Hence,
n.elem − dn′ .elem ≡ n.elem − (dn′ .elem ∨ n
′.elem). Thus,
n.elem −
∨
d∈D(n) d.elem ≡ n.elem − (
∨
d∈D(n) d.elem ∨∨
n′ 6∈(A(n)∪D(n)) n
′.elem) ≡ n.elem −
∨
a′ 6∈A(n) a
′.elem .
Note that for any a′ 6∈ A(n) there exists a′′ ∈ A(a′) − A(n)
such that a′′.elem ∈ M: consider b ∈ A(a′) − A(n)
such that all of its immediate parents are in A(n). Note
that such node exists because the root of the DAG is in
A(n). It must be the case that b.elem ∈ M, otherwise
b.elem ≡ p1.elem ∧ p2.elem where p1, p2 ∈ A(n) which
in turn means b ∈ A(n) (a contradiction). So we can set
a′′ = b. Note that a′.elem ∨ a′′.elem ≡ a′′.elem . By
application of this observation to all a′ 6∈ A(n) we get∨
a′ 6∈A(n) a
′.elem ≡
∨
{Pi ∈ M : ∃a
′ 6∈ A(n) : a′.elem =
Pi} ≡
∨
{Pi ∈M : ∀a
′ ∈ A(n) : a′.elem 6= Pi}.
Putting all together, PEC(n) can be re-written as n.elem −∨
a′ 6∈A(n) a
′.elem ≡
∧
{Pi ∈ M : ∃a ∈ A(n) : a.elem =
Pi} −
∨
{Pi ∈M : ∀a
′ ∈ A(n) : a′.elem 6= Pi}.
APPENDIX D
DETAILED EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
This section details our experimental results, including
run-time and memory usage of the different PEC-emptiness
solutions. In addition, our experiments compare #PEC to both
APV and ddNF.
Dataset Insertions PECs
Empty
PECs
Atomic
Preds.
PEC-construction
time (s)
PEC-emptiness check (s) APV (s) Memory (MB)
Z3 ddNF #PEC BDD SAT Card. BDD SAT Card. APV
REANNZ-IP 1,159 1,160 25 1,135 <1ms <1ms 0.016 0.414 <1ms 0.001 6 6 3 5
REANNZ-Full 1,170 12,783 275 12,508 0.112 0.009 2 9 0.018 3 14 26 9 10
Azure-DC 2,942 5,096,869 10,450 5,086,419 3301 121 20112 47829 30 25669 4,429 5,797 2,365 2,517
Berkeley-IP 584,944 584,945 29,813 Timeout Timeout 2709 1553 460 0.515 Timeout 302 701 227 Timeout
Stanford-IP/bbra 1,825 1,825 10 1,815 <1ms <1ms 0.019 0.657 <1ms 0.041 6 7 3 5
Stanford-IP/bbrb 1,620 1,620 8 1,612 <1ms <1ms 0.017 0.566 <1ms 0.033 6 7 3 5
Stanford-IP/boza 1,614 1,614 3 1,611 <1ms <1ms 0.018 0.582 <1ms 0.039 6 7 3 5
Stanford-IP/bozb 1,453 1,453 2 1,451 <1ms <1ms 0.017 0.521 <1ms 0.033 6 6 3 5
Stanford-IP/coza 184,909 184,909 4,840 180,069 471 334 7 82 0.122 4911 102 252 69 49
Stanford-IP/cozb 183,376 183,376 4,840 178,536 465 327 15 83 0.121 4924 100 252 68 49
Stanford-IP/goza 1,767 1,767 1 1,766 <1ms <1ms 0.021 0.639 <1ms 0.045 6 7 3 5
Stanford-IP/gozb 1,669 1,669 1 1,668 <1ms <1ms 0.02 0.603 <1ms 0.041 6 7 3 5
Stanford-IP/poza 1,489 1,489 1 1,488 <1ms <1ms 0.017 0.532 <1ms 0.033 6 6 3 5
Stanford-IP/pozb 1,434 1,434 1 1,433 <1ms <1ms 0.017 0.514 <1ms 0.032 6 6 3 5
Stanford-IP/roza 1,567 1,567 2 1,565 <1ms <1ms 0.018 0.57 <1ms 0.039 6 7 3 5
Stanford-IP/rozb 1,483 1,483 1 1,482 <1ms <1ms 0.017 0.531 <1ms 0.034 6 6 3 5
Stanford-IP/soza 184,682 184,682 4,841 179,841 471 347 7 82 0.119 4951 102 251 69 49
Stanford-IP/sozb 180,944 180,944 4,841 176,103 443 315 9 83 0.12 4711 99 250 68 48
Stanford-IP/yoza 4,746 4,746 3 4,743 <1ms <1ms 0.076 2 0.002 2 8 9 4 6
Stanford-IP/yozb 2,592 2,592 1 2,591 <1ms <1ms 0.036 0.969 0.001 0.303 6 7 3 5
Stanford-IP/All 197,828 197,828 4,874 192,954 266 199 19 89 0.156 5149 122 265 85 53
Stanford-Full/bbra 918 43,450 0 43,450 2 0.361 2 20 0.049 12 39 38 20 26
Stanford-Full/bbrb 861 16,017 0 16,017 0.221 0.001 0.552 7 0.019 3 17 17 9 12
Stanford-Full/boza 316 23,230 0 23,230 0.076 <1ms 0.91 11 0.018 3 23 23 12 17
Stanford-Full/bozb 286 19,662 0 19,662 0.043 <1ms 0.719 9 0.014 2 20 20 10 15
Stanford-Full/coza 417 14,120 0 14,120 0.032 <1ms 0.547 7 0.02 2 16 18 9 12
Stanford-Full/cozb 346 9,200 0 9,200 0.029 <1ms 0.346 4 0.011 1 11 13 6 9
Stanford-Full/goza 326 26,396 0 26,396 0.149 0.016 1 12 0.021 3 26 26 14 19
Stanford-Full/gozb 306 23,202 0 23,202 0.11 0.014 1 10 0.017 2 23 22 11 17
Stanford-Full/poza 243 14,883 0 14,883 0.017 <1ms 0.532 7 0.011 1 16 16 9 12
Stanford-Full/pozb 230 13,284 0 13,284 0.002 <1ms 0.473 6 0.009 1 15 15 8 11
Stanford-Full/roza 181 7,933 0 7,933 <1ms <1ms 0.254 3 0.006 0.567 11 11 5 8
Stanford-Full/rozb 166 6,930 0 6,930 0.001 <1ms 0.216 3 0.005 0.421 10 10 5 8
Stanford-Full/soza 524 16,764 81 16,683 0.056 <1ms 0.668 9 0.024 2 18 19 10 13
Stanford-Full/sozb 355 9,238 64 9,174 0.028 <1ms 0.333 4 0.011 0.828 11 12 6 9
Stanford-Full/yoza 507 60,363 231 60,132 5 0.17 4 38 0.17 20 46 65 31 28
Stanford-Full/yozb 353 27,313 208 27,105 0.97 0.001 2 16 0.066 6 23 33 15 14
Stanford-Full/All 2,732 1,176,095 48,906 1,127,189 560 28 692 1958 4 2314 895 1,077 544 439
Fig. 15: Evaluation results for datasets that encode match conditions as ternary bit vectors
Dataset Insertions PECs
Empty
PECs
Atomic
Preds.
PEC-construction
time (s)
PEC-emptiness check (s) APV (s) Memory (MB)
BDD SAT Card. BDD SAT Card. APV
Diekmann/A 45 66 6 60 0.003 0.006 0.418 <1ms 0.004 5 11 2 4
Diekmann/B 51 58 3 55 0.002 0.005 0.215 <1ms 0.003 5 12 2 4
Diekmann/C 31 92 0 92 0.001 0.005 0.333 <1ms 0.008 5 12 1 4
Diekmann/D 262 3,630 0 3,630 0.048 0.568 14 0.014 1 14 23 11 8
Diekmann/E 98 344 0 344 0.004 0.021 1 0.002 0.039 6 13 2 4
Diekmann/F 5,317 888,652 40 888,612 64 408 4799 11 2988 7,436 7,448 7,517 608
Diekmann/G 5,321 889,646 40 889,606 39 413 4729 10 2385 3,843 3,854 3,924 608
Diekmann/H 5,463 919,353 56 919,297 40 424 5005 11 2547 3,911 3,923 3,995 628
Diekmann/I 5,426 908,849 56 908,793 40 417 4799 11 2478 3,865 3,877 3,948 622
Diekmann/J 6,004 1,058,897 56 1,058,841 71 486 5654 13 2936 4,558 4,573 4,656 700
Diekmann/K 3,242 400,911 257 400,654 18 157 2084 3 732 1,997 2,006 2,031 233
Diekmann/L 3,724 433,399 198 433,201 19 174 2284 3 921 2,200 2,209 2,236 262
Diekmann/M 136 426 0 426 0.009 0.021 1 0.003 0.028 5 12 2 4
Diekmann/N 136 418 0 418 0.006 0.021 1 0.002 0.027 5 12 2 4
Diekmann/O 569 314,160 0 314,160 30 100 1149 2 345 912 921 937 245
Diekmann/P 578 492,378 4 492,374 47 168 1837 4 635 1,563 1,573 1,606 324
Diekmann/Q 307 4,626 38 4,588 0.087 0.763 17 0.016 0.94 21 29 18 7
Diekmann/R 36 85 0 85 <1ms 0.006 0.311 <1ms 0.013 5 12 1 4
Diekmann/S 332 792 0 792 0.014 0.023 3 0.004 0.167 7 14 4 4
Diekmann/T 2,343 8,878 0 8,878 0.132 0.341 33 0.076 11 48 55 46 8
Diekmann/U 73 93 0 93 0.002 0.004 0.334 <1ms 0.002 5 12 2 5
Diekmann/V 43 65 0 65 0.001 0.005 0.236 <1ms 0.007 5 12 2 4
Diekmann/W 35 34 0 34 0.001 0.003 0.125 <1ms 0.002 5 11 1 4
Diekmann/X 92 78 0 78 0.002 0.006 0.265 <1ms 0.008 5 12 2 4
Fig. 16: Evaluation results for iptables rule-sets
